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Since the early 1970's, ever-increasing numbers of couples
have rejected the commitment and long-term responsibilities
of marriage. Rather, many couples are opting to live together
outside the confines of a legal relationship.1 Recent demo-
graphic studies show that as many as 2.6 million couples in
America are choosing the alternative of cohabitation.2 These
cohabitants are raising novel legal questions about property
and support rights following the termination of their
relationships.
The variety of legal issues raised by cohabiting living
arrangements is best illustrated by a typical hypothetical
cohabitant's situation. Suppose a client, Ms. Jones, seeks legal
assistance in order to protect her rights following the breakup
of her ten year relationship with her live-in mate, Mr. Jones.
The couple met in college, graduated, and decided to live
together without the benefit of marriage; however, Ms. Jones
assumed Mr. Jones' name. Mr. Jones indicated that he would
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1. In the past, such relationships were frequently referred to as meretricious
relationships. The term meretricious is defined as "of the nature of unlawful sexual
connection." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 988 (6th ed. 1990). The use of the term
meretricious implies that cohabitation is unlawful and immoral, consequently
perpetuating a negative image of these relationships. This Author declines to use the
term in light of society's current acceptance of cohabitation. But cf. Peffley-Warner v.
Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 246 n.5, 778 P.2d 1022, 1023-24 n.5 (1989) (recognizing the
negative connotations of the term meretricious but nevertheless continuing to apply it
to cohabitants).
2. James R. Wetzel, American Families: 75 Years of Change, 113 MONTHLY LAB.
REv. 3, 4 (1990). Cohabitants tend to be younger: over 60% are younger than thirty-
five years of age. Cohabiting couples also are likely to end their relationships at the
altar; according to a recent University of Wisconsin study, 37% marry within two
years. Id. In 1989, the traditional model of marriage still accounted for 52.9 million
households in the United States. Id. at 5.
172 University of Puget Sound Law Review
take care of Ms. Jones if she would agree to stay home and
assume responsibility for the domestic aspects of their life
together. Consequently, Ms. Jones never pursued her career.
She stayed home, bore two children, and ran the household.
Mr. Jones became a successful architect, providing economic
support for the household. The couple purchased a home and
lived together in a marriage-like relationship for ten years.
Mr. Jones eventually decided he was unhappy with the rela-
tionship and moved out. Apart from the property division
issues, Ms. Jones' critical needs for support exceed what Mr.
Jones is obligated to pay in child support. Ms. Jones has no job
outside the home, no prospects for employment in the near
future, and no stream of income with which to pay the
expenses of day-to-day living. What relief is available to Ms.
Jones under Washington State law? This area of post-cohabi-
tation support has not yet been addressed by the Washington
courts.
This Comment will explore the alternative legal theories
on which Ms. Jones may proceed and the various approaches
that courts have followed in an attempt to resolve post-cohabi-
tation support issues. These theories range from status propos-
als to contract remedies. Initially, this Comment will examine
traditional theories of marital support and their relation to
post-cohabitant support. Next, this Comment will review
express contract, implied-in-fact contract, and quasi-contract
theories of support and how these different theories have been
effectively applied by various state courts. A brief discussion
follows concerning federal courts and the confusion surround-
ing the federal jurisdiction of cohabitation actions. Finally, the
contract theories of relief will be contrasted against proposed
legal status solutions.3 Ultimately, this Comment concludes
that post-cohabitation support issues are best resolved through
contract theories. Solutions based on legal status are
extremely intrusive and impose unbargained-for terms upon
unwilling parties. In contrast, contract analysis more accu-
3. In this Comment, the term "status" represents those privileges or obligations of
an individual or class that are state-imposed. One common example of legal status is
marriage. The individual has very little control over the legal responsibilities imposed
by status; it does not respect the unique choices and understandings of the parties. For
an interesting discussion of how state-imposed legal status impedes contractual
freedoms in cohabitation, see Howard 0. Hunter, An Essay on Contract and Status:
Race, Marriage and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1076 (1978).
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rately rewards the actual expectation and reliance interests of
the parties.
In particular, this Comment will argue that support should
be awarded to a dependent cohabitant only if an express con-
tract existed. In the absence of an express contract, the depen-
dent cohabitant should only be able to recover the value of his
or her services in quasi-contract in order to prevent the unjust
enrichment of the supporting party. These two remedies,
based on express and quasi-contract, give the courts flexibility
while preserving and honoring the intent and expectations of
the parties to the greatest extent possible. Consequently, state-
imposed legal obligations are avoided. Alternative approaches,
such as implied-in-fact contract actions or status based reme-
dies4  present troubling policy concerns. With these
approaches, the state often takes a more intrusive role, impos-
ing legal obligations on parties that are contrary to their
intent.
II. THEORIES OF POST-MARITAL AND POST-COHABITATION
SUPPORT
A. Traditional Post-Marital Support
Before analyzing support in the context of cohabitation,
we will examine and distinguish traditional marital support
obligations. Post-marital support is commonly referred to as
alimony or, more recently, maintenance. Alimony is a state-
imposed legal obligation of support. At common law, women
lost their legal identity upon marriage; therefore, the husband
had a legal obligation to support his wife.5 In the event of legal
separation or divorce, the husband's duty to support continued
on the theory that the wife had a perpetual right of support as
if the marriage had remained intact. This theory was based
upon the fault of the husband for divorcing his innocent wife.
Thus, under the fault system of divorce, many jurisdictions
4. Status remedies are contract obligations that are state-imposed. Under this
view, the freedom of individualized relations is secondary to the state's interest in
creating and supervising standardized relations. The result is a decline in the role of
individual bargaining to contract because the state supplies the terms of the
agreement. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 1.7, at 23 (1990).
5. Upon marriage, women forfeited their legal right to contract, purchase or sell
land, bring legal actions, and make testamentary disposition of property. The husband
retained all control over the marital assets, necessitating a legal duty to support. John
Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REV. 954, 965 n.47 (1991).
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only allowed alimony claims by innocent wives divorcing guilty
husbands.6
With the advent of no-fault divorce laws came variations
of the common law permanent alimony award. Under modern
state laws, courts now use their equitable powers to award ali-
mony (now frequently referred to as maintenance) on the basis
of need, rehabilitation, restitution, or a lump-sum award char-
acterized as part of the property division. Indeed, the lines
between alimony or maintenance and property division are
becoming increasingly blurred.7 Often a court will take into
account the amount of a property settlement when determin-
ing an equitable maintenance or alimony award. Parties may
prefer to characterize money as alimony or maintenance to
take advantage of favorable tax consequences.
In the state of Washington, marital spousal support, or
maintenance, is calculated by considering the following factors:
need for rehabilitation (i.e., job training), ability to pay, stan-
dard of living, length of marriage, and fitness or health.' Some
factors serve a rehabilitative function by assessing a spouse's
ability to procure employment. For instance, a spouse's health,
past education, and experience will limit his or her employ-
ment options. After these factors are evaluated, a court may
6. Ira Mark Eliman, Theory of Alimony, 77 CA. L. REV. 3,5-6 (1989).
7. Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MiCH. J.L. REF. 217,
227-28 (1990).
8. The Washington dissolution statute contains separate provisions for property
division (WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.080 (1989)) and maintenance (WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.09.090 (1989)). The maintenance statute provides:
Mhe court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse. The
maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as
the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, after considering
all relevant factors including but not limited to:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
separate or community property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet
his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support
of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find employment appropriate to his skill,
interests, style of life, and other attendant circumstances;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations of the
spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.090 (1989).
[Vol. 15:171
Cohabitant Contractual Obligations
award maintenance to assist the spouse in obtaining the train-
ing or education necessary for support in a lifestyle comparable
to the standard enjoyed during marriage. Other factors, such
as length of marriage and standard of living, serve a compensa-
tory function. The contrasting views of alimony as rehabilita-
tive or compensatory have resulted in some dissension among
authorities. Some experts have argued that alimony should
have a rehabilitative function,9 while others see it as compen-
satory in nature.10 The compensatory rationale is based on the
fact that the wife has traditionally made a substantial invest-
ment of time and services during the marriage that deserves
compensation. She is often left at a disadvantage because
although her domestic services and child-raising functions have
value to her husband, such skills have no real value on the
open market."
Under this compensatory theory, post-marital support
serves an economic function by compensating spouses for lost
opportunity costs and loss in expected gain from marriage.' 2 In
short, even though maintenance is state-imposed on the basis
of the parties' status as a married couple, compensatory main-
tenance also makes sense from a contractual standpoint
because it strives to fulfill the parties' original expectations.
Some of the same compensatory considerations inherent in the
economic analysis of marital support are also relevant to the
analysis of service and support contract actions among
cohabitants.
B. Post Cohabitation Support
Turning to the issue of post-cohabitation support, some-
9. Christina M. Fernandez, Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal
Support, 30 STAN. L. REv. 359, 376 (1978).
10. Economist Elisabeth Landes argues that the function of alimony is to
compensate wives for lost opportunity costs forgone in favor of investing in the
marriage. She contends that alimony awards encourage efficient resource allocation
within marriage and increase the parties' gain and productivity. Elisabeth M. Landes,
Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 36 (1978).
11. Ira Mark Ellman points out that the husband's contribution of financial
support has considerable market value. In essence, the wife bears the burden in the
early years of marriage and reaps benefits later, whereas the husband reaps benefits
produced by the wife's services early on. Furthermore, the husband does not share the
benefits of his market success until later in the relationship. Ellman, supra note 6, at
42.
12. Landes, supra note 10, at 62. For a very interesting discussion of civil contract
principles as applied to marriage, see Carbone, supra note 5.
1991]
176 University of Puget Sound Law Review
times inaccurately referred to as palimony, 3 a great diversity
of case precedent exists in American jurisdictions regarding
the treatment of cohabitants' property and support rights. The
landmark case dealing with cohabitation issues is Marvin v.
Marvin.4 The California Supreme Court took an active judi-
cial role and forged into the very heart of the cohabitation con-
troversy. In an opinion by Justice Tobriner, the court
announced that contracts between cohabitants were enforce-
able to the extent that they were not based on illicit sexual
consideration. Justice Tobriner indicated that relief could be
granted on express contract theory, implied contract theory, or
in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household serv-
ices. 5 In an enigmatic footnote, the court added that it did not
intend to discourage additional remedies in equity that might
evolve to protect the reasonable expectations of parties should
the causes of action listed above prove inadequate.'6
After remand and a second appeal, however, the Marvin
appellate court retreated somewhat from the sweeping pro-
nouncements of the California Supreme Court.'7 The trial
court found that although the parties, Michelle and Lee, had
no express agreement for Michelle's support, she deserved a
$104,000 lump-sum award to finance her career rehabilitation.'"
Thus, the trial court reasoned that Lee was responsible for
Michelle's rehabilitation because he had terminated the rela-
tionship and left her with no means of support.'9 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that Michelle had not
pleaded any legal theory on which to base such an award.2,
The appellate court recognized that a support award may be
appropriate in some cases provided it is based upon a legal
cause of action.21 Because there was no contract or unjust
enrichment, the court found no basis for a rehabilitative
award. While need and ability to pay could justify mainte-
13. The term palimony connotes an award of post-cohabitation support analogous
to alimony. Alimony is a state-imposed legal obligation in dissolution actions based on
the need, length of marriage, and financial situation of the parties. Post-cohabitation
support is not a state-imposed obligation but is based on an agreement between the
parties.
14. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
15. id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
16. Id at 684 n.25, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.25.
17. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
18. Id. at 873, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
19. Id. at 874, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
20. Id. at 875, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
21. Id. at 875, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
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nance awards in marital contexts, these factors were insuffi-
cient to award maintenance to cohabitants absent statutory
authority.
In contrast to the active Marvin court, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Hewitt22 adopted a passive judicial
role when dealing with cohabitation issues, maintaining that
cohabitation was an issue better suited for legislative action.
The court declined to grant any relief to a cohabiting spouse on
the grounds that public policy gave the state a strong interest
in protecting the sanctity of marriage.'
Thus, Hewitt occupied the opposite end of the spectrum
from Marvin, with harsh results for cohabitants. Noting that
the Marvin case had received wide publicity prior to the Illi-
nois legislature's enactment of the Illinois Marriage and Disso-
lution of Marriage Act, the Hewitt court concluded that the
legislature did not intend to recognize Marvin or to extend
property rights to unmarried cohabitants.' The Illinois court
left the matter to be resolved, if at all, by the state legislature.
Although no Washington cases directly address support
awards among cohabitants, the Washington courts have also
struggled with the legal problems presented by cohabitants. In
a pivotal case, In re Marriage of Lindsey,2 the Washington
Supreme Court applied a status remedy and recognized that
cohabitants could have enforceable property rights.2 The
court applied an analysis similar to that used in property distri-
butions in marital dissolutions, holding that Washington courts
have equitable power to examine a cohabiting relationship and
award property on a just and equitable basis.27
22. 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
23. Id. at 65, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
24. Id. at 64, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
25. 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984).
26. Id. at 307, 678 P.2d at 332.
27. Id. at 304, 678 P.2d at 331. The parties in the Lindsey case lived together for
two years prior to marriage, and the wife claimed an interest in the insurance proceeds
from the destruction of a barn and shop built during the parties' premarital
cohabitation. The wife contended that she had helped build the barn and shop and
should be awarded a share of the insurance proceeds. The case was remanded for a
just and equitable determination of her premarital interest in the property, just as it
would have been in a legal marriage under Washington's dissolution statute. Id. at 307,
678 P.2d at 332. Lindsey does not specifically provide any particular guidelines to
determine precisely what sort of relationships would be subject to a just and equitable
disposition. Other cases have considered the continuity and duration of relationship,
pooling of resources, and services as relevant factors. See Latham v. Hennessey, 87
Wash. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1976).
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The Lindsey case overruled a rule of law known as the
Creasman presumption' that advocated leaving the parties in
a cohabiting relationship as they stood when they ceased living
together. The rationale behind the presumption was that the
parties had disposed of the property as they intended. This
rule could produce harsh results if one party provided all the
consideration for the property but the other party held legal
title. The Lindsey court went to great lengths to eliminate the
Creasman presumption; however, the Lindsey court may have
also been influenced by the fact that the parties were indeed
married and that the cohabitation had been a prelude to their
marriage.
Immediately prior to Lindsey, Division One of the Wash-
ington State Court of Appeals held in Warden v. Warden'
that the Washington divorce statute3 0 for property distribution
governs nonmarital relationships that are tantamount to a fam-
fly-like relationship.3' This application of a divorce statute to a
cohabiting relationship was a radical departure from other
jurisdictions; in fact, the Warden approach has been expressly
rejected in other states.3 2
28. In Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d. 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), the court ruled
that, in a cohabiting relationship, property would be awarded to the party who had
legal title regardless of who had supplied the consideration for the property. The
Creasman presumption stated: "[I]n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be presumed as a matter of law that the parties intended to dispose of the
property exactly as they did dispose of it." Id. at 356, 196 P.2d at 841. The Lindsey
court recognized the inequity of such an uncompromising rule: "The rule often
operates to the great advantage of the cunning and the shrewd, who wind up with
possession of the property, or title to it, in their names at the end of a so-called
meretricious relationship." Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 303, 678 P.2d at 330 (Finley, J.,
concurring) (quoting West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 316, 311 P.2d 689, 693 (1957)).
29. 36 Wash. App. 693, 676 P.2d 1037 (1984).
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1989).
31. Warden, 36 Wash. App. at 698, 676 P.2d at 1039.
32. The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to recognize the Warden approach
because "[a]lthough the Warden case provides support for the plaintiff's argument,
most courts which have addressed the issue of whether marriage dissolution statutes
provide relief to unmarried cohabitants have either rejected or avoided application of a
marriage dissolution statute to unmarried cohabitants." Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d
506, 517, 405 N.W.2d 303, 308 (1989). The court declined to extend the application of
the dissolution statute to unmarried cohabitants. Id. at 517-18, 405 N.W.2d at 309.
Conversely, the Warden court reasoned that because the Washington State
Legislature had extended the divorce statute to invalid marriages, the statute should
similarly be extended to any marriage-like cohabitation. Warden, 36 Wash. App. at
698, 676 P.2d at 1039. The court indicated that, among other factors, a court should
look at the relationship's length and purpose, offspring of the relationship, the
contributions of the parties, and future prospects of each. Id. at 698, 676 P.2d at 1039.
In Warden, the parties had lived together for nine years, held themselves out as
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Lindsey and Warden arguably allow the state to intervene
in marriage-like cohabitations and impose marriage-like obliga-
tions on the parties, including support obligations. In other
words, a court may consider the nature, length, and purpose of
the relationship; if it resembles a marriage, the court may
apply the Washington maintenance statute' by analogy. How-
ever, Washington courts could turn to another, more desirable
alternative to state-imposed support. Cohabitants in Washing-
ton could seek relief based on contract theory. In order to
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, one
must examine the policy considerations underlying cohabita-
tion contracts, the various theories on which they are based,
and the application of these theories in other jurisdictions.
III. CONTRACT THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Several contract theories are available for recovery of sup-
port or services of cohabitants. The unique policy issues that
arise when these legal remedies are applied to cohabitants shed
light on the relative advantages of these theories in the context
of cohabitation.
The initial inquiry regarding cohabitant contract claims is
whether they are enforceable at all as a matter of public pol-
icy. Traditionally, public policy has prohibited the enforce-
ment of contracts for sexual relations.' Thus, one dilemma
presented by a cohabitation agreement is how the agreement's
consideration can be separated from the sexual aspects of the
parties' relationship. One author has suggested that courts
have been reluctant to enforce agreements between parties
having a sexual relationship because judges were influenced by
traditional notions that women were providers of sex, not part-
ners in enjoyment.' In other words, if sex were seen as being
mutually satisfying to both parties, it could then be severed
husband and wife, filed joint tax returns, and raised two children. Id. at 694, 676 P.2d
at 1037. Applying the above guidelines, the appellate court concluded that the trial
court correctly treated the parties as a marital family. Id. at 698, 676 P.2d at 1039.
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.090 (1989).
34. Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements:
Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 163, 191 (1985). The author notes
that in the area of extramarital sexual relations, a great difference exists between a
contract for prostitution or sexual services in exchange for money and a cohabitation
relationship in which the sexual relations of the parties are only one aspect of the
overall relationship.
35. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1111 (1985).
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from the rest of the contract. The Marvin court recognized
that the sexual aspect of a cohabitation relationship is severa-
ble from the parties' agreement provided sufficient non-sexual
consideration supports the contract. 6
Another policy consideration tending to discourage
enforcement of cohabitation agreements is the policy encourag-
ing marriage. Preserving the sanctity of marriage is the main
policy justification of the Hewitt court.37  Nevertheless,
enforcement of cohabitation agreements may not discourage
marriage at all. If a potential cohabitant knows that he or she
risks being held accountable for any agreements made pursu-
ant to a cohabiting relationship, that individual may be discour-
aged from entering into such a relationship.' Thus, marriage
may become a more attractive alternative because it provides
many legal benefits to its participants not usually available to
cohabitants. 9
In some situations, however, a cohabitant's promise to sup-
port may conflict with other traditional support obligations.
For instance, if Mr. Jones was under an obligation for child
support from a previous relationship or marriage, the child
support obligation should have priority as a matter of public
policy over a promise to support a cohabitant. Similarly, if Mr.
Jones is under a previous obligation to pay alimony or mainte-
nance to a previous wife, the promise to support Ms. Jones
should not be enforced to the detriment of the alimony obliga-
tion. In such cases, the public policy favoring child support and
spousal support would override any secondary support agree-
ments between cohabitants.
By recognizing cohabitants' right to recovery on traditional
contract legal theories, courts can honor the parties' expecta-
tions and intentions without intruding on the sanctity of mar-
riage. This result preserves the cohabitants' rights and abilities
36. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 670, 557 P.2d 106, 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822
(1976).
37. "In thus potentially enhancing the attractiveness of a private arrangement
over marriage, we believe that the appellate court decision in this case contravenes the
[Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage] Act's policy of strengthening and
preserving the integrity of marriage." Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 62, 394 N.E.2d
1204, 1209 (1979).
38. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 4 (1979). Of course, this deterrent effect depends on a cohabitant's knowledge of
potential risk.
39. Common marital rights include insurance and Social Security benefits, rights
to intestate succession, health insurance benefits, pension benefits, and so forth.
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to contract and avoids penalizing parties merely because they
have chosen an alternative lifestyle.' Just as importantly, a
contract analogy avoids the equation of cohabitation with mar-
riage, and it also avoids imposing the doctrine of common law
marriage on unsuspecting cohabitants.4'
In conclusion, a contract approach is a more equitable
result because it will more closely give effect to the parties'
intentions. Of course, the particular contract theory utilized
and the relief awarded will vary according to the unique facts
of each case.' Several legal theories may be utilized effec-
tively in contract actions, and they are best analyzed
individually.
IV. EXPRESS CONTRACT
The most universally accepted cause of action with respect
to cohabitants is express contract. Ideally, the parties should
have a written contract; unfortunately, this is rarely the case.
The overwhelming majority of express contracts litigated
between cohabitants are oral.43 In order for parties to enter
into an oral agreement for support or services, they must man-
ifest their assent to a mutual obligation by which the intent of
the parties can be ascertained and honored." In the case of
our hypothetical client, Mr. Jones could make an offer by
promising Ms. Jones that he would care for her and provide
lifetime economic security for her in exchange for her agree-
ment to move in with him and assume domestic duties. If Ms.
Jones either orally agrees or simply moves in, she has mani-
fested her acceptance of Mr. Jones's offer.45 Thus, the parties
have expressed their assent to a bargained-for exchange, and
the possible presumption of gratuitousness is overcome. The
40. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
41. Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on
the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAu. L.Q. 101, 115 (1976). For a discussion of
common law marriage, see infia text accompanying notes 82-87.
42. Bruch, supra note 41, at 115.
43. Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective,
28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1164 (1981).
44. Subjective intent and manifestation of form have an inherent tension,
however. Even in an express contract, questions of interpretation will compel the
court to examine closely the circumstances of the parties' understanding. Dalton,
supra note 35, at 1100.
45. If Ms. Jones makes a return promise to Mr. Jones to move in and provide
services, the contract is bilateral because both parties have made promises. If Ms.
Jones manifests her assent by moving in and commencing performance, the contract is
unilateral.
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continuity of the cohabitation further serves as evidence of the
parties' intent to be bound. The amount of support will
depend on the terms of the parties' agreement such as length
of commitment and the standard of support promised."
Once an arrangement has been identified, a court must
next analyze whether the arrangement provides sufficient con-
sideration to uphold an agreement for support of a specific
duration. Domestic services, exclusive of sexual relations,
47
have sufficient value to serve as consideration for a return
promise for items such as property rights or financial sup-
port.48 Even if a couple has lived together for only a short
period of time and the opportunities foregone are negligible,
nonetheless, sufficient consideration may exist for a support
agreement. The parties are in the best position to judge the
value of their promises, and courts are reluctant to inquire
intrusively into the sufficiency of consideration. If the parties
have made a bargained-for-exchange, then both the promise
and return promise have value in the parties' subjective view
and should be analyzed as such.
Finally, the parties must be able to show that their oral
contract does not violate the Statute of Frauds.49 Most cohabi-
tants do not bother to execute written contracts; as a result,
the overwhelming majority of cohabitation contracts are oral
agreements. Although the Statute of Frauds prohibits enforce-
ment of oral contracts not to be performed within one year,
courts have interpreted this provision to exclude promises of
support for life because the possibility of the dependent party's
death within one year would preclude the Statute of Frauds.'
46. Although many sophisticated parties probably would not commit themselves
to a lifelong obligation for support, many parties would agree to support for a limited
period of time, such as while one is attending school. The issue of definiteness is very
important to cohabitation contract analysis because definite contract terms define the
scope of the obligations. Thus definite terms are necessary in order to determine
whether a party has breached a contractual obligation. Definite terms also allow a
court to provide the legal remedy. A promise "to support" may fail for indefiniteness
unless the parties' subsequent course of performance fleshes out the terms of the
promise. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 3.28, at 210-28. See also infra note 92 and
acccompanying text.
47. See supra notes 34-36 and acccompanying text.
48. Bruch, supra note 41, at 111.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.010 (1989).
50. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 6.4 at 415; see also Thurston v. Nutter, 125 Me.
411, 134 A. 506 (1926); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Reeves, 96 N.J. Eq. 490, 125 A. 582
(Ch. 1924), qff'd mem, 98 N.J. Eq. 412, 129 A. 922 (1925). Even if the promise is
merely to support without any language extending the promise for life, the promise is
outside of the Statute of Frauds and enforceable because the limitation of life is
[Vol. 15:171
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Thus, in our example, Ms. Jones is a party to an enforceable
contract for lifetime support in exchange for her domestic
services. If Mr. Jones breaches, he should be legally accounta-
ble for his actions. 51
From an economic standpoint, the enforcement of these
contracts will encourage efficient breaches.5 2 In other words,
when the breaching party decides that ending the contract is
more valuable than continuing performance, he or she will opt
to do so and pay damages.' Enforcement of this type of con-
tract ensures that only efficient breaches will occur and that
both parties' intentions will be honored.' By enforcing con-
tracts of this nature, the law imposes costs on breaching parties
and discourages careless behavior in the contract process.-
The basic measure of damages should give the injured party
the benefit of the bargain and compensate the injured party
implicit in the concept of support; for example, if the dependent party dies within one
year, the contract is performed. Duncan v. Clarke, 308 N.Y. 282, 125 N.E.2d 569 (1955).
Furthermore, most courts will enforce an oral agreement in which the party seeking
enforcement has performed. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 6.9, at 440.
51. If the dependent party, in this case Ms. Jones, is the breaching party, the
supporting party would have a duty to mitigate damages until he or she procures a
substitute for the services being provided by the dependent party. The dependent
breaching party would not receive support if he or she is in breach. One problem these
cohabitants present is the difficulty of ascertaining who actually breached first. This
question would have to be resolved by the trier of fact in each case.
If the supporting party is the breaching party, the dependent party has an
obligation when possible to mitigate damages by making substitute arrangements for
support and thereby avoiding future loss. In cohabitation agreements, because the
dependent cohabitant is the supplier of services, he or she is under a duty to dispose of
services on the market if possible. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.12 at 862, 896-
97. However, the dependent cohabitant should not be forced to seek out or accept
employment of an inferior or substantially different nature. See Parker v. 20th
Century Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d. 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970).
Unfortunately, if the relationship has lasted for several years, the dependent party
may not have any marketable skills and would be unable to mitigate damages by
finding other employment.
52. Many factors may contribute to a party's decision to breach rather than
continue performance. The efficiency of a breach is determined not only by financial
factors, but also by emotional factors. In many cases, a party may have financial
motivations to stay within the contract terms, but emotional considerations provide
incentive to breach. Economic analysis of contract formation and breach takes into
account both financial and emotional elements. Emotional satisfaction may have just
as much value as financial satisfaction within the context of a cohabiting relationship.
53. "[I]t is not the policy of the law to compel adherence to contracts but only to
require each party to choose between performing in accordance with the contract and
compensating the other party for any injury resulting from a failure to perform."
KRONMAN, supra note 38, at 106.
54. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.3 at 846.
55. KRONMAN, supra note 38, at 4.
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based on his or her expectation of the agreement. This result
leaves the injured party in a position as favorable as if the con-
tract had been fully performed.' As a result, neither party is
worse off, and the breaching party may be better off. Thus,
the breach is efficient because resources are allocated to their
highest and best use. 7
Moreover, contract enforcement may influence a wide
range of life choices made during cohabitation. For instance,
the decision whether to be a full-time homemaker, pursue a
career, or have children, may be influenced by the degree of
economic security promised by the supporting party.' The
other party's actions in reliance on that promise may result in
substantial personal costs such as foregone career opportuni-
ties. If individuals are aware that they are legally accountable
for promises to support, they will be less likely to make such
offers carelessly. The end result may be twofold: first, cohab-
iting couples may have an incentive to plan their future more
carefully, and second, cohabiting couples may strive to make
their agreements work. Thus, when parties have expressly
agreed to the terms of their agreement, less danger exists that
one party will be subjected to unbargained for terms after the
contract is efficiently breached.
A number of courts have applied an express contract anal-
ysis to actions for support by cohabitants. For example, the
New Jersey courts have been extremely liberal in construing
contract actions for support. Their approach is best illustrated
by Crowe v. De Gioia.59 In that case, Mrs. Crowe and Mr. De
Gioia had lived together for twenty years. Mrs. Crowe alleged
that Mr. De Gioia had made an oral promise to support her for
the rest of her life. Consequently, Mrs. Crowe moved in with
him, performed household services, remained his constant
companion, and cared for his personal needs. In return, Mr.
De Gioia provided her with financial support for twenty years
until he moved out and terminated the relationship. As a
result, Mrs. Crowe was left with no means of support. She
56. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.8 at 871.
57. Landes, supra note 10, at 46.
58. See Baker, supra note 7, at 229.
59. The Crowe case originally went up to the New Jersey Supreme Court on an
interlocutory appeal for temporary support. Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 447 A.2d
173 (1982). After remand, the trial court decision was reviewed by a New Jersey
Appellate Court. Crowe v. De Gioia, 203 N.J. Super. 22, 495 A.2d 889 (1985).
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then brought suit against Mr. De Gioia for breach of his prom-
ise to support her for life.
The New Jersey courts resolved two issues in this case:
(1) temporary support during the pending litigation and
(2) the final support award. The initial appeal was interlocu-
tory and sought temporary support in the form of a prelimi-
nary mandatory injunction for Mrs. Crowe until her trial date.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a preliminary
mandatory injunction was appropriate where necessary to pre-
vent irreparable harm if (1) the claim had a settled legal basis,
(2) granting of the injunction would not cause relative hard-
ship, and (3) the moving party showed a reasonable chance of
success on the merits.60 Applying this rule, the court held that
temporary support pendente lite was appropriate because Mrs.
Crowe had no other means of support, her claim for lifetime
support was a valid cause of action in New Jersey, Mr. De
Gioia would suffer relatively inconsequential expense, and
Mrs. Crowe had a reasonable probability of ultimate success.61
The court further determined that the contract action
should properly be heard in the Chancery Division because
other contract cases for personal support had likewise been
brought in equity. The appellate court noted that cohabitant
contract cases and matrimonial actions often have similar sub-
stantive and proof issues.62
On remand, the Chancery court found that Mr. De Gioia
had made an express promise both to take care of Mrs. Crowe
for the rest of her life and to give her their residence.' The
court recognized that her twenty years of domestic services
and companionship were sufficient consideration to support
the promise; furthermore, Mrs. Crowe's performance took the
contract out of the Statute of Frauds.' The court acknowl-
edged that although the parties also had a sexual relationship,
it was not the basis of the promise.6 The trial court not only
awarded Mrs. Crowe the family residence but also awarded her
a lump sum as expectation damages for the breach of contract
for support. The court multiplied an annual support figure of
$14,300 by Mrs. Crowe's life expectancy and arrived at a final
60. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-34, 447 A.2d at 176-77.
61. Id. at 136, 447 A.2d at 178.
62. Id. at 138, 447 A.2d at 179.
63. Crowe v. De Gioia, 203 N.J. Super. 22, 28, 495 A.2d 889, 893 (1985).
64. Id. at 33-34, 495 A.2d at 896.
65. Ic at 32, 495 A.2d at 895.
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judgment of $155,642.63. The appellate court affirmed both
awards.6
Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld an express
personal services contract between cohabitants in Kinkenon v.
Hue.67 Ms. Kinkenon claimed that Mr. Hue invited her to
move onto his farm, and in exchange for her personal and
domestic services, he would take care of her for the rest of her
life. The parties lived together for six years in an intimate
relationship. During that time, they built a residence on one of
Mr. Hue's farms. The trial court found the existence of an
express oral agreement and established that Ms. Kinkenon
provided services in exchange for lifetime support.'
Worth noting is the court's reliance on Marvin as author-
ity to dispense with the presumption of gratuitousness for per-
sonal services rendered between cohabitants.69 The court also
held that the agreement was taken out of the Statute of Frauds
by Ms. Kinkenon's partial performance.7 ° Finally, the court
held that Mr. Hue breached his promise to support when he
threatened Mrs. Kinkenon and forced her to leave the resi-
dence. Rather than grant specific performance, however, the
trial court required Mr. Hue to pay Ms. Kinkenon the value of
a life estate in the home. The Nebraska Supreme Court
upheld this award as a correct measure of damages for the
breach of promise of lifetime support.7
V. IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
A more difficult case is presented when the parties have
no express agreement. Normally, an implied-in-fact contract
may be inferred from the acts of the parties with the same
legal consequences as an express contract.72 The usual legal
test is whether a reasonable person in the other party's posi-
tion would infer a promise in return for a promise or perform-
ance.71 A problem arises, however, when this rule is applied to
66. Id. at 35-36, 495 A.2d at 897.
67. 207 Neb. 698, 301 N.W.2d 77 (1981).
68. Id. at 703, 301 N.W.2d at 80.
69. "T]here is no more reason to presume that services are contributed as a gift
than to presume that funds are contributed as a gift." Id. (quoting Marvin v. Marvin,
18 Cal. 3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 830 (1976)).
70. Kinkenon, 207 Neb. at 704, 301 N.W.2d at 81.
71. Id. at 705, 301 N.W.2d at 81.
72. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at 135.
73. Id.
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cohabitants because of the intimate nature of their relation-
ship. Even under a reasonable person standard, a court may
have difficulty determining in a family-type relationship
whether the party receiving the benefit understood that the
services rendered were intended as compensation and were not
merely gratuitous.74 Even if the party providing services can
prove a mutual understanding of compensation, a court would
likely find that the obligation was merely compensation for
past services.75 The court would be reluctant to infer that the
services were provided with the expectation of future support
for life.
Nevertheless, some courts have disregarded the traditional
presumption of gratuity in intimate cohabitant relationships
and paved the way for complete recovery of damages from
implied-in-fact contract actions.76 Other courts have taken a
more cautious approach and declined to recognize a contract
implied from giving and accepting services." The New York
Supreme Court in Morone v. Morone7' recognized the
problems inherent in ascertaining the terms of an implied-in-
fact contract:
As a matter of human experience personal services will fre-
quently be rendered by two people living together because
they value each other's company or because they find it a
74. Id., but see Thomas v. Thomas, 105 Wash. 127, 177 P. 680 (1919). See also Kintz
v. Read, 28 Wash. App. 731, 626 P.2d 52 (1981) (enforcing an implied-in-fact contract
between cohabitants for personal services rendered in a joint business venture).
75. In other words, a court may interpret the reciprocal obligation on the part of
the supporting spouse as merely an obligation to compensate for services already
received rather than a continuing obligation for support. Fernindez, supra note 9, at
385.
76. 'There is no more reason to presume that services are contributed as a gift
than to presume that funds are contributed as a gift; in any event the better approach
is to presume ... that the parties intend to deal fairly with each other." Marvin v.
Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 830 (1976). See also
Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 528 n.19, 405 N.W.2d 303, 312 n.19 (1987). On remand,
however, the Marvin trial court seemed unwilling to apply this presumption. The
court refused to infer the existence of a support contract between the parties and
overturned a rehabilitative award to Michelle Triola on the grounds that merely
establishing the plaintiff's need and the defendant's ability to pay was insufficient.
Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 559. Because Ms. Triola could show
no basis in equity or law for the rehabilitative award, it was deleted from the
judgment. Id. at 876, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
77. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1980); Ford v. Wagner, 153 Mich. App. 466, 395 N.W.2d 72 (1986); In re Estate of
Alexander, 445 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1984); Johnston v. Estate of Phillips, 706 S.W.2d 554
(Mo. App. 1986); Tapley v. Tapley, 122 N.H. 727, 449 A.2d 1218 (1982).
78. 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1986).
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convenient or rewarding thing to do. For courts to attempt
through hindsight to sort out the intentions of the parties...
runs too great a risk of error. .. . There is, therefore, sub-
stantially greater risk of emotional afterthought, not to men-
tion fraud, in attempting to ascertain by implication what
services, if any, were rendered gratuitously, and what com-
pensation, if any, the parties intended to be paid.79
In economic terms, enforcing these implied-in-fact con-
tracts may impose excessive error costs. In other words, as the
Morone court recognized, enforcing these contracts would
allow cohabitants with no previous expectation of compensa-
tion to change their tack after their relationships have ended
and claim that they had a reasonable expectation of compensa-
tion. Consequently, courts would be intervening and writing a
new contract for the parties when neither party ever had any
intention to become legally bound. Thus, enforcing implied-in-
fact contracts for support would lead to inconsistent, uncertain,
and potentially fraudulent results.'* Moreover, the couple's
choice not to marry suggests that they never intended to create
a lifetime support obligation."'
Such a scenario also raises the specter of common law
marriage. Common law marriage is a status remedy that was
imported from Europe to cope with the increased incidence of
cohabitation during the 19th century.' The requirements of
common law marriage are twofold. First, the parties must
prove a present agreement to marry. Second, they must
openly live in a marital-type relationship and hold themselves
out to the community as husband and wife.83 The legal conse-
quence of common law marriage is the imposition of legal mar-
ital status.
Most states have now abolished common law marriage,
79. Id. at 488, 407 N.E.2d at 441, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 596. But see Marvin v. Marvin, 18
Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1976) (allowing recovery
under implied contract theory).
80. William A. Reppy, Jr., Pot and Support Rights of Unmarried
Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1691
(1984) (noting that a court could find an implied terminable-at-will contract just as
easily as a promise to support for life).
81. Id.
82. J. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudhill, A Reconnaissance of Public Policy
Restrictions upon Enforcement of Contracts Between Cohabitants, 18 FAM. L.Q. 93, 117
(1984).
83. Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of
a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEo. L.J. 1829, 1850 (1987).
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largely because of deeply rooted policies that encourage for-
malized marriages. In addition, common law marriages create
proof problems that invite perjury and fraud." Given the
strong legislative distaste for common law marriage, courts
should be hesitant to uphold implied-in-fact agreements for
services between cohabitants for the same reasons. Although
some argue that a benefit is naturally contemplated in return
for services,' others argue that it is difficult to prove that the
services were rendered in expectation of future support. A
more plausible explanation is that the services were rendered
for the support received at the time.' In addition, the provider
of the services is also receiving a benefit: free rent and sup-
port. Thus, an implied-in-fact services contract is more analo-
gous to an employment contract terminable at will. Even if
the parties have an implied understanding that services will be
exchanged for support, if the agreement is silent as to the
duration of performance, a term should be supplied that allows
either party to terminate at will.
8 7
This reasoning was followed by the New York Court of
Appeals in Morone v. Morone.8 The court held that although
New York would recognize express contracts between cohabi-
tants, it would not extend this recognition to contracts implied-
in-fact. The couple in Morone had cohabited for 23 years, dur-
ing which time Ms. Morone had borne Mr. Morone two chil-
dren, performed domestic duties, and held herself forth as Mr.
Morone's wife. Ms. Morone's first cause of action was based on
an implied-in-fact contract claim. Ms. Morone alleged that the
parties had an implied-in-fact contract because she had pro-
vided domestic services in the expectation of compensation and
because Mr. Morone accepted the services knowing that she
expected compensation. The court dismissed the claim, reason-
ing that the relationship of the parties created a presumption
that the services were rendered gratuitously.8 9 The court fur-
ther noted that it would run the risk of fraud and disagree-
84. Prince, supra note 34, at 196.
85. Id. at 205.
86. A more compelling argument is presented when the relationship has produced
children. In such a case, if one party has focused their energies on raising the children,
an expectation of support is more likely.
87. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.17 at 555.
88. 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980).
89. The court noted that domestic services are often rendered between parties
living together merely because they find it a convenient or rewarding thing to do. Id.
at 488, 407 N.E.2d at 441, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
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ment in ascertaining the terms of such a contract; moreover,
the contract would violate the legislative policy in abolishing
common law marriage.
90
Nevertheless, the court upheld Ms. Morone's second cause
of action. The second claim was based on an alleged express
oral partnership agreement between the parties, in which Ms.
Morone would provide domestic services in return for the
defendant's promise to support and care for her. The agree-
ment contemplated that the parties would equally split the net
profits from their partnership. The appellate court determined
that such a promise by Mr. Morone was enforceable as long as
the parties' sexual relationship provided no part of the consid-
eration for the agreement.9 '
In contrast, the well-reasoned dissent by Judge Jones con-
cluded that a promise "to take care of" someone was too vague
to be enforceable. He asserted that a promise to support must
be specific, stating a standard of support or measure of lifestyle
to be maintained. Judge Jones also pointed out that the dam-
ages sought, net profits from the partnership, were equally
indefinite and inconsistent with the terms of the alleged
contract.92
In spite of the obstacles mentioned above, even a termin-
able-at-will implied contract for services in exchange for sup-
port may afford some relief at its termination. In our
hypothetical situation, suppose that Ms. Jones and Mr. Jones
had no express agreement for lifetime support, and the circum-
stances do not demonstrate such an understanding. Aside from
a possible ancillary agreement to share property, Ms. Jones
should also be able to seek relief under a quasi-contract theory
and receive compensation for the value of the services she
provided.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 489, 407 N.E.2d at 440, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 594. Here again, the distinction
between support and property was blurred. Although the promise was to support, the
court chose to award property as damages for breach of the promise to support. Thus,
the court declined to award specific performance.
92. Judge Jones noted that the agreement did not require Mr. Morone to pursue
profit making activity and that ascertaining the profits would be difficult. The judge
pointed out that the relief requested, one-half of the net profits, was at odds with the
actual terms of the contract, which were a promise to provide services in exchange for





In the event that cohabitants cannot prove a legal contract,
a remedy still exists. Quantum meruit measures recovery
under implied-in-law contract or quasi-contract, and may be
used only when no contract in fact exists.93
Quantum meruit is designed to compensate a plaintiff for
the value of services rendered; in other words, it restores to
the plaintiff the value of benefits received by the defendant.94
This area of law is still developing and falls between contract
and tort.95 Damages are normally assessed at the market value
of the plaintiff's time and expenses. If the duration of the
relationship was lengthy, the damages could be substantial.
Market value is not consistently used as a measure of damages,
however. Some courts have departed from the objective fair
market valuation method to assess damages and adopted a
more subjective method to value the benefit of services
received. 96
The main advantage of the quantum meruit theory is that
it affords relief to parties who did not have an express agree-
ment and would otherwise be left in an impoverished economic
position. Quantum meruit also allocates the burden of finan-
cial compensation to the parties who were benefitted by the
relationship. This avenue of relief is limited, however. A court
may deny recovery if the benefit was gratuitously conferred; in
other words, if Mrs. Jones had chosen to stay home and raise
the children without the expectation of compensation, quan-
tum meruit would not be appropriate.' The disadvantage of
applying this doctrine to cohabitants is that, once again, the
cohabitant seeking relief may have to overcome the presump-
tion of gratuity between parties in family-like relationships.
93. "'Quantum meruit' as an amount of recovery simply means 'as much as
deserved' . . . and measures the recovery under an implied contract to pay
compensation as the reasonable value of services rendered." Kintz v. Read, 28 Wash.
App. 731, 735, 626 P.2d 52, 55 (1981) (quoting Lester N. Johnson Co. v. Spokane, 22
Wash. App. 265, 274, 588 P.2d 1214 (1978)).
94. Bruch, supra note 41, at 124.
95. GRANT GILoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr 88 (1974).
96. In one case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not look at the fair market
value of services rendered, but instead looked to the subjective value that the
supporting party placed on the services received. Because the supporting party had
provided a substantial legacy for the dependent party in his will, the court concluded
that the value of the legacy was a reasonable valuation of the dependent party's
services. Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1989).
97. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.20, at 106.
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This approach is distinguishable, however, from implied-
in-fact contracts because the intent of the recipient is irrele-
vant in quasi-contract; only the intent of the providing party is
important. Therefore, the presumption of gratuitousness does
not pose the same problem in quasi-contract. An action in
quasi-contract is based upon the premise that a duty arises to
make restitution when retention of a benefit conferred would
be unjust. This cause of action is not based upon an agreement
between the parties. Rather, it is based on an implied-in-law
obligation to prevent injustice; it is not designed to give one
party an unexpected windfall.
Relief in quasi-contract may be measured either by the
increase of the recipient's wealth resulting from the benefit
conferred or, alternatively, by the recipient's cost avoided less
the market value of the benefit received by the injured party.9'
To illustrate, in our hypothetical situation, Ms. Jones would
have the option of requesting the value of her services (as a
cost avoided to Mr. Jones) less any benefit conferred on her by
Mr. Jones. In the alternative, she could request an award
equal to the increase of Mr. Jones' wealth attributable to her
efforts.
One scholar has attacked the quantum meruit measure of
relief on the grounds that the value of services less value of
support bears no relationship to the rehabilitative needs of a
homemaker at the termination of a cohabitation relationship. 9
However, one must remember that cohabitation is not the legal
equivalent of a marriage relationship, and the function of sup-
port between cohabitants is not necessarily analogous to the
function of support between spouses. The real key in a quan-
tum meruit action is the restitution of a benefit conferred
under circumstances that make its retention unjust. Quantum
meruit does not provide reliance damages.
In a marriage, the parties have presumptively made a life-
time commitment. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the par-
ties have valid concerns about support as a function of
rehabilitation. Relief in quasi-contract, however, is based on
unjust enrichment. The purpose of this remedy is to compen-
sate, not rehabilitate. Therefore, this remedy is retrospective,
not prospective.
Applying this theory, a recent Wisconsin decision, Watts v.
98. Id. at 109.
99. Blumberg, supra note 43, at 1166.
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Watts,1°° took an interesting approach. The parties cohabited
for twelve years, during which time they held themselves
forth as married, raised two children, filed joint tax returns,
maintained joint bank accounts, and purchased property as
husband and wife. Ms. Watts alleged that she quit her job and
moved in with Mr. Watts when he indicated that he would pro-
vide for her. During the period of the parties' cohabitation,
Mr. Watts' net worth increased from $382,756 to $1,496,657.
When the parties' relationship ended, Ms. Watts brought
suit against Mr. Watts on several legal theories, including the
Warden theory10 ' that analogously applies the divorce statute
as well as breach of contract, partition, and unjust enrichment
theories. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the Warden
approach on the grounds that the legislature did not intend to
extend the Wisconsin dissolution statute to encompass cohabi-
tants.' °2 Nevertheless, the court recognized that the plaintiff
had a cause of action in contract, partition, and unjust
enrichment. 10 3
The court stated that in order to prove unjust enrichment,
the plaintiff must show: (1) a benefit conferred on the defend-
ant, (2) appreciation of the benefit, and (3) inequitable reten-
tion of the benefit.1°4 On remand, the trial court held that the
defendant had been unjustly enriched and awarded the plain-
tiff a judgment of $113,090.1o The court reasoned that ample
evidence showed that Ms. Watts' services enriched Mr. Watts
by enabling him to increase his property holdings."° Having
determined that Ms. Watts was entitled to compensation for
the value of her services performed over the span of the rela-
tionship, the court adopted an innovative approach when it val-
ued her services. Mr. Watts had executed a will leaving Ms.
Watts ten percent of his personal estate; the trial court con-
cluded that this amount was an appropriate measure of the
value of her services. Accordingly, the court awarded Ms.
Watts approximately ten percent of the increase in Mr. Watts'
100. 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
102. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 517-18, 405 N.W.2d at 309.
103. Id. at 538, 405 N.W.2d at 316.
104. Id. at 531, 405 N.W.2d at 313.
105. Watts v. Watts, 152 Wis. 2d 370, 448 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1989). The trial
court also found that the parties had an implied contract to share the increase of
wealth accumulated during the relationship but awarded no damages. Id.
106. Id. at 381, 448 N.W.2d at 296-97.
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net estate.10 7 This award was a departure from the more tradi-
tional method of using fair market value to determine the
value of services in quantum meruit; however, courts in cohab-
itation actions often expand traditional remedies in order to
award the appropriate relief.
In conclusion, contract theories for support and services
contracts between cohabitants provide legal remedies that pro-
tect the expectations of the parties, compensate injured parties,
and prevent the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense
of another. As the above cases illustrate, however, state courts
are still struggling with the legal nature of cohabitant causes of
action. Consequently, this area of law is still indistinct and
poorly defined. This confusion is caused in part by its rela-
tively recent emergence and expansion in American
jurisprudence.
The inconsistencies of the state courts are also mirrored in
the federal court system. Federal courts are similarly unsure
of the precise legal nature of suits between cohabitants. As a
result, the analysis and remedies utilized by the federal courts
often differ dramatically.
VII. FEDERAL COURTS
The initial question faced by federal courts is whether
cohabitant causes of action are suits at law over which a fed-
eral court has jurisdiction in diversity or whether they are
suits in equity that fall under the domestic relations exception
to federal diversity jurisdiction. Although a domestic relations
case may meet the statutory requirements for federal question
jurisdiction"~s or federal diversity jurisdiction,1°9 the federal
courts traditionally view domestic relations litigation as a mat-
ter more properly litigated in state courts.1 0 The rationale for
this exception is that the states have a paramount interest in
the marriage and family concerns."'
107. Id. at 382, 448 N.W.2d at 297.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
110. As Justice Holmes observed in a case denying federal jurisdiction in a divorce
proceeding, "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the United States."
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1929) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S.
586, 593-94 (1890)). For a detailed discussion of the federal domestic relations
exception, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court.
Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571 (1984).
111. Atwood, supra note 110, at 589.
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This rationale was reflected in Anastasi v. Anastasi, in
which the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey remanded a palimony case to a New Jersey state court
on the grounds that the case fell within the domestic relations
exception to federal jurisdiction." The Anastasi court based
its decision on the fact that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Crowe v. De Gioia113 had recently held that cohabitation
actions were most appropriately heard in the equity or chan-
cery division rather than the law division of the state court." 4
The federal district judge noted that New Jersey had a signifi-
cant state interest in hearing cohabitation cases. To protect
that interest, the trial court would have to make the same
kinds of inquiries that are relevant in domestic relations
actions." 5 As a result, the federal court concluded that cohabi-
tation actions fell within the domestic relations exception to
federal jurisdiction."
6
In contrast, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York retained jurisdiction of a cohabitation
action in Korby v. Erickson."7 The court reasoned that the
case did not fall within the domestic relations exception to fed-
eral jurisdiction because agreements between unmarried
cohabitants did not create the matrimonial status necessary to
qualify for the exception."' The court noted that federal juris-
diction was appropriate because no marital rights were
involved; rather, the claim was a contract action in diversity
based on a pooling agreement between the parties." 9
These conflicting decisions emphasize the confusing nature
of cohabitation actions in federal as well as state courts. Given
this confusion, is contract really the best way for cohabitants to
obtain relief, or would other alternatives be more effective?
112. Anastasi v. Anastasi, 544 F. Supp. 866 (D.N.J. 1982).
113. 90 N.J. 126, 447 A.2d 173 (1982).
114. Anastasi, 544 F. Supp. at 868.
115. "Final resolution of the controversy will inevitably require extensive probing
into many other issues similar to those in a matrimonial action in order 'to best
achieve a just result in this evolving cause of action' . . . [Tlhese are the kinds of
inquiries and judgments which the state courts are best equipped to handle." Id.
116. Id.
117. 550 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
118. Id. at 138.
119. Id. Accord Bower v. Weisman, 650 F. Supp. 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (federal
court retained jurisdiction of Marvin style cohabitation action).
1991]
196 University of Puget Sound Law Review
VIII. LEGISLATIVE/JUDICIAL STATUS ALTERNATIVES
IN RELIEF
Some authorities assert that the best way to clarify judicial
uncertainty in cohabitation law is to accord cohabiting parties a
separate legal status because of the strong state interest in
these actions.' States have a strong interest in clarifying
cohabitation law because the state becomes the substitute
source of support if one party is left economically devastated
by an irresponsible partner. An inherent tension exists, how-
ever, in the state's interest because parties often choose to
cohabit instead of marry precisely because they wish to avoid
state-imposed legal obligations. Nevertheless, some authorities
have proposed that giving cohabitants a legal status is the most
reasonable way to meet the cohabitants' economic needs.' 2 '
These status proposals, however, invariably ignore the inten-
tions of the parties as well as the important policy justifica-
tions underlying the institution of marriage.
A. "De Facto" Marriage: Judicially Created Status
One author has proposed that courts should confer legal
status on cohabitants for purposes of spousal support.'22 A
finding of "de facto" marriage would impose the obligations of
a legal marriage on the parties. A de facto marriage would
require two conditions: (1) the parties must hold themselves
forth as husband and wife, and (2) the parties must cohabit for
a significant period of time.' On a prima facie showing of de
facto marriage, a presumption of an agreement for spousal sup-
port would arise, and the burden of proof would shift to the
contesting spouse to prove no support obligation.'2A The sup-
port awarded would be rehabilitative in nature, allowing the de
facto spouse to make a transition to a new life. The author
rationalizes that because cohabitation is often a substitute for
marriage, a cohabitant may often expect and hope for future
support. 2 5
120. See Fernandez, supra note 9; Reppy, supra note 80; and Kandoian, supra note
83.
121. See Fernandez, supra note 9; see also Reppy, supra note 80; and Kandoian,
supra note 83.
122. Fernandez, supra note 9, at 371.
123. Id. at 371-72.
124. I& at 389.
125. Id. at 391. This model differs from traditional common law marriage, which
requires not only that the parties hold themselves forth as husband and wife but also
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One major flaw in this status theory is that even in a mar-
riage dissolution action no presumption of post-marital support
automatically arises.' To place such a burden on cohabitants
would often give one party a windfall merely because the sup-
porting party could not prove an agreement to the contrary.
Such a scenario is hardly in accord with the expectations of
most cohabitants. Even those cohabitants who hold themselves
forth as husband and wife would not expect an automatic pre-
sumption of support beyond that provided for legally married
spouses. Thus, an unfair burden would be placed on the sup-
porting party to overcome the presumption of a support
agreement.
B. Legislative Status
Yet another author proposes that legislation should be
enacted to create a new status: lawful cohabitation.' Cohabi-
tants would enter the status either by formal recordation or
through "common-law cohabitation," in which certain acts of
the couple would cause the status to attach.Ms The legal result
of this status would be to confer quasi-marital status on cohabi-
tants for purposes of support, property division, taxes, social
security, and intestate succession.'- The property and support
rights of the cohabitants would be somewhat narrower than
those arising from marriage.1i s
This scheme is also flawed in that it would still impose
legal status on many couples who had no desire to assume such
overwhelming legal obligations. Such legislation would also
require substantial judicial intervention at the cessation of a
cohabitation relationship. If the parties have "registered" their
status, they would not have the option of dissolving it on their
own and avoiding the court system. Thus, as in marriage, the
termination of the relationship would require adjudication and
termination of the status. The detriments of increased judicial
proceedings and state intervention outweigh the benefits real-
ized by such a small section of society.
that they have a present agreement to be husband and wife. See, e.g., HOMER H.
CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES § 2.4, at 105 (2d
Practitioner's ed. 1987).
126. See supra note 8.
127. Reppy, supra note 80, at 1678.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1684.
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C. Abolishment of Marital Distinctions
Others would have society pursue the status approach
even further and determine legal status based on an objective
view of the parties' relationship. 3' Rather than using a bright-
line, formalized test such as marriage to determine legal obli-
gations, a court would consider factors indicating the nature of
the relationship and degree of commitment. Important factors
would include pooling of finances, child bearing, childcare
responsibilities, and the overall stability of the relationship.
32
Such an approach encourages recognition of non-traditional
families and discourages discrimination of alternative life-
styles. Nevertheless, this approach thrusts legal obligations on
those who may not have desired them.
The dangers inherent in status remedies have been recog-
nized by the Washington State Supreme Court in recent
actions, and the court has limited the status rights and privi-
leges of unmarried cohabitants. In the first case, Davis v.
Department of Employment Security,'" the court held that a
person who voluntarily terminates employment to live in a
cohabitant relationship does not qualify for unemployment
compensation. Although the Washington State Employment
Security Act allows unemployment compensation for those
persons who quit work because of marital status, the court
refused to extend the statute to cover cohabitants. The court
noted that "Lindsey does not stand for the proposition that a
meretricious relationship is the same as a marriage."'"
The second case, Peffley- Warner v. Bowen,"3 involved the
rights of cohabitants in intestate succession. The plaintiff
argued that because Lindsey"3 recognized the expanded prop-
erty rights of cohabitants, that doctrine should also be applied
to intestate succession. The Washington Supreme Court
rejected this argument and limited Lindsey to property divi-
sions following termination of a cohabiting relationship. The
court refused to expand the Lindsey theory to encompass
131. Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried People in
American Law, 30 ARiz. L. REV. 207 (1988).
132. Id. at 239.
133. 108 Wash. 2d 272, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987).
134. Id. at 278, 737 P.2d at 1266; see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
135. 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989).
136. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984); see supra




Similarly, the Washington Appellate Court in Division
Three refused to expand Warden' 3 to encompass awarding
attorney fees in cohabitation actions.' 39 The court reasoned
that Warden and Lindsey applied the divorce property disposi-
tion statute"4 only by analogy and that the remainder of the
Domestic Relations Act was not applicable to cohabitation
relationships. 4
This recent line of cases indicates that the Washington
courts are not yet ready to accord full legal status to cohabi-
tants despite the Lindsey and Warden holdings. These recent
cases recognize the inherent problems in extending state-
imposed legal privileges and obligations to cohabitants outside
of individual agreements and support the case for restricting
remedies for cohabitants to express contract or quasi-contract
theories.
These status proposals attempt to define legal obligations
for cohabitants. The difficulty with status solutions is that
once the bright line of demarcation for legal responsibilities is
abolished, parties no longer have certainty in planning rela-
tionships and their legal effects. The formalities of marriage
were originally instituted to avoid uncertainty, define marital
obligations, and protect against bigamy. 142 If legal support obli-
gations are imposed by the state on cohabitants based on fac-
tors other than formalized marriage, the court must make
objective and subjective determinations every time a relation-
ship is disputed. The result would be unnecessary litigation
and excessive administrative costs. Imposing legal status on
cohabitants would also create uncertain results in income tax-
ation, intestate succession, employment benefits, social security
benefits, and worker's compensation. Thus, an administrative
or judicial finding would be necessary every time an issue
arose as to a cohabitant's rights.
IX. CONCLUSION
Express contract and quasi-contract actions offer efficient
137. Peffley-Warner, 113 Wash. 2d at 252-53, 778 P.2d at 1027.
138. Warden v. Warden, 36 Wash. App. 693, 676 P.2d 1037 (1984); see supra notes
25-28 and accompanying text.
139. Western Community Bank v. Helmer, 48 Wash. App. 694, 740 P.2d 359 (1987).
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1989).
141. Helmet, 48 Wash. App. at 699, 740 P.2d at 362.
142. Kandoian, supra note 83, at 1853.
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remedies for cohabitants who are left at an economic disadvan-
tage because of reliance on their relationship. Contract actions
are preferable to alternatives that would confer legal status on
cohabitants because contract actions more closely honor the
parties' intent and expectations. If cohabitants have not
entered into an agreement, an injured party may still seek
relief on an unjust enrichment or quasi-contract theory. Relief
under this theory protects against potential abuse of unequal
bargaining power and economic control by the stronger party.
Freedom of contract allows cohabitants to allocate efficiently
responsibilities and benefits between them, and enforcement of
these agreements will encourage parties to deal fairly with
each other in a responsible manner.
On the other hand, courts should be cautious to recognize
implied-in-fact contracts between cohabiting parties because of
the possibility of fraud and the difficulty in ascertaining the
terms of the bargain. In particular, this caution is warranted
when post-cohabitation support is requested. If the parties fail
to allocate their resources prior to cohabitation, quasi-contract
theory will protect a vulnerable party against unjust enrich-
ment and compensate for services rendered without awarding
an unexpected windfall.
The flexibility and diversity of contract remedies are more
than adequate to protect the rights of cohabitants. By compari-
son, status remedies are not as economically efficient and give
the state a much more intrusive role because the state must
impose its will on the parties. Finally, the policy concerns
which have abolished common law marriages in the majority
of states are also applicable to status remedies. Status reme-
dies blur the distinctions between marital rights and individual
rights, ultimately causing confusion as to legal rights and
responsibilities. People often choose to cohabit and avoid mar-
riage precisely to escape the legal responsibilities that status
remedies would impose. The state should honor that choice.
Status proponents may argue that contract theories are
ineffective remedies in an intimate domestic relationship. The
vast quantity of case law, however, demonstrates the contrary.
Issues arising in the context of cohabitation relationships are
successfully being adjudicated, and the courts are effectively
utilizing a variety of contract theories. Awards of support and
property based on contract theories are proving to be the most
efficient remedy for cohabitants. At the same time, contract
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theory preserves the scope and legal integrity of marital obliga-
tions and rights.
Although Washington courts have previously hinted at a
status approach for cohabitants in Lindsey and Warden, those
cases should be strictly limited to their facts and not applied to
support awards. More recent decisions support this view.'4 3 In
conclusion, a judicial trend supporting contract theory would
create more certainty and efficiency in cohabitation law.
143. Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989); Davis v.
Department of Employment Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272, 787 P.2d 1262 (1987); Western
Community Bank v. Helmer, 48 Wash. App. 694, 740 P.2d 359 (1987).
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